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South Afrca's achievements in building peace and democratic stability are widely
regarded as a success. It is often heralded as a model also for other countres emerging
out of deep and protracted violent conflicts. South Afrca also emerged as a major
recipient in the new wave of democracy assistance, which began around 1990.
Together with Guatemala South Afrca was the main target for Scandinavian
assistance to human rights and democratisation in the first half of the 1990s.3
Ths paper shall address one dimension in the efforts to build peace and consolidate
the new democracy in South Afrca; the role of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC). How did it deal with pastatrocities? How did it perform? How
did it contrbute to national and political reconciliation? In the final section the paper
attempts to identify the main lessons leared and the recommendations for post-
conflct societies attempting to deal with the violations of the past.
First, the paper wil provide a brief overview of peace efforts and nation building in
South Afrca.
An overview of peace efforts
South Afrca's 1993 Interim Constitution and the April 1994 elections saw the end of
aparheid and the birth of a new democracy. This was a democracy typically forged
"from below". It followed years of popular mobilisation, which forged regime elites
to negotiate a transition. During intense negotiations the key trade-offs in the
negotiated settlement were hamered out and the uncertainties of the transition
limited. International actors assisted and faciltated the transition. Their role were
strongest in the run up to the negotiations though varous pressures on the regime,
inc1uding sanctions, combined with financial assistance to the liberation movements
in exile and the emerging civil society within South Afrca. The international society
i This paper was prepared for the international conference on Guatemala: Five Years After the Peace
Accords, Oslo 4-5 December 2001, organised by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
(PRIO).2 Senior research fellow, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.
3 See more on the emergence of democracy support in development assistace in my "Foreign aid
donors and democratisation in the South", pp. 35-55 in L. Thompson (ed.): Development, Democracy
and Aid in Southern Africa, Cape Town: CSAS, University of the Western Cape 2001.
was less involved in the negotiations itself. The transition was strongly mediated and
co-ordinated by domestic actors.4
The negotiated package revolved around the adoption of a new constitution which
provided for the holding of free and fair e1ections based on the principle of one
person, one vote. The key components were a very liberal constitution based on the
principle of separation of power, parliamentary democracy, a strong independent
constitutional court as well as the establishment of a number of constitutionally
protected institutions to defend democracy. The constitution was also firmly anchored
in a concern for human rights, with a state-of-the-ar Bil of Rights inc1uded. An
important component was also the requirement that all paries securing 10% of the
votes should be entitled to proportional rèpresentation in a Governent of National
Unit y in a transitional period of five years.
The 1993 Interim Constitution, which paved the way for. democratic elections, was
essentially a peace pact reached between the minority, the apartheid regime, and the
disenfranchised majority, led by the ANC, in a situation where neither was defeated
and none was a victor. None of the key parties in the negotiations had any previous
commitments to liberal political ideals. Both parties saw the constitution as an
instrent of political compromise. It was designed to protect the interests of the
outgoing apartheid regime and its support groups under a new and democratically
elected regime. For the incoming regime led by the ANC it became important to
ensure that the new Constitution gave it the measures required to pursue a policy for
social and economic reform and ensured that it had the means necessar to
consolidate political power.
The two main parties, the National Party and the Afrcan National Congress, came to
see the liberal constitution as a compromise able to satisfy their main objectives. This
was no doubt reinforced by the key negotiators itself (on both side they were trained
lawyers), by the global political c1imate after the end of the Cold War, and in some
areas also by pressures from domestic groups callng for a protection of human rights.
It must also be kept in mind that the outcome of the negotiations and the positions
adopted were clearly informed by the fact that all paries knew that the outgoing
regime would end up as a potentially very small opposition. The dominant ruling
pary, the ANC, on the other hand would be expected to a get clear majority of the
votes. Both paries also realised that there were no alternatives to a negotiated
solution.
The new Constitutions and the new politicalorder succeeded in bringing political
stability to South Afrca. In 1994 the country was at the brink of civil war. One
national and two local elections later the threat of political violence has almost
vanished and no significant political groups contemplate an exit from the political
system in order to fight it from the outside. The rules of the game as laid out the
Constitution have been recognised. Former enemies may continue to disagree, but
they have leared to live together in peaceful coexistence and social stability and to
respect each other as equal citizens in a democratic society. In this sense the path
4 There is a wealth of studies available on the South African transition. Arecent analysis, which
compares it to the Central American experiences is provided in E. 1. Wood: Forging democracy from
below. Insurgent transUions in South Africa and El Salvador, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2000.
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chosen in South Afrca has been a success. Peace, democracy and stabilty have
arved. There is national political reconciliation and TRC ChaIr Desmond Tutu's
vision of a rainbow nation may have been realised.
The reasons for this success canot. be ascribed to the drafting of rules for political
behaviour and the establishment of democratic political institutions alone. A number
of other factors are necessary to explain the path of the South Afrcan transition. One
is the role of the new dominant ruling party, the ANe. It had the support of the vast
majority of South Afrcans and enjoyed a de facto two-third majority in the new
Parliament. The former apartheid regime was politically marginalised. They were in
no position to set aside agreements and solutions negotiated before the April 1994
elections. The ANC and its leader Nelson Mandela used its position to pursue a policy
of skilful political manoeuvrng to achieve reconciliation. The opposition was co-
opted or marginalised. Political power was consolidated around the ANC without
antagonising the former regime. The repressive powers of the former regime through
its controlover the militar and the police were weakened and eventually almost lost
through the ANC's security sector reforms.
The socialand economic policies installed hope of a better future for South Afrca's
black majority without at the same creating fear among the white minority.
Furthermore, the economic interdependence in South Afrca is so high that the option
ofbreaking away and sabotaging is not viable. The costs are too high and the benefits
of staying within are too attractive. Finally, South Afrca had the financial resources
and the institutional capacity to "buy off' and marginalise potential spoilers.
It must be emphasised that South Afrca's main achievement in nation building lies in
building political reconciliation between economic and political elites. There are
many shortcoming and failures as we move to the 10calleve1 and everyday life. The
racial divide is stil very present politically, economically and socially. Political
loyalties are mainly shaped by racial identities. Blacks vote for the ANC and whites
for the New National Party or the Democratic Alliance (although the leadership of
these paries, especially the ANC, including their parliamentary groups, is multiracial
and multiethnic). The number of people living in absolute povert has not changed
significantly since 1994. The economic policy has failed to create employment and
take people out of income poverty although service delivery and welfare polices have
improved significantly in certain areas. The main economic winners have been the
rapidly expanding black middle classes both in the private and public sectors. They
have increased their share of income and wealth signficantly in the years after the
1994 elections. There are also elements of mismanagement and corrption within the
public service. Some also point out that there is growing centralisation of power and
authoritarianism within the ruling pary.
Nor has South Afrca been able to properly transform the criminal justice system and
police making it efficient in preventing and combating crime. Violent crime has
emerged as a paricular important destabilising factor in the consolidation of the new
democracy.
Despite this, the overall conclusion stil stands: South Afrca's achievements in
building political reconciliation at the nationallevel are significant and remarkable.
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Pursuin9 truth and reconcilation
South Afrca created a number of human rights institutions specifically to safeguard
human rights and to build the new democracy. The most important of these was the
South Afrcan Truth and Reconcilation Commission (TRC). It was established by
Parliaments 1995 Promotion o/National Unity and Reconcilation Act and set up the
same year. The TRC was partly modelled on experiences from Latin America, but it
was given a wider mandate and far more resources. The bulk of its activity came to an
end in 1998 with the publication of its five-volume report although it wil formally
dose down only at the end of 2001. TRC has internationally come to been seen as
main model for how newly democratising and post-conflct societies should deal with
the dark chapters of their recent past.
Mandate, origin andpowers
TRC's objective was to address the legacy ofthe past by promoting national unit y and
reconciliation. It had to do this by
1. Developing a complete picture as possible of the causes, nature
and extent of gross human rights violations between March 1960
and May 1994;
2. Facilitating the granting of amesty to persons who would make a
full disdosure of all the facts relating to a gross human rights
violation with a political objective;
3. Establishing and making known the whereabouts of victims,
restore the human and civil dignity of survivors by giving them an
opportnity to relate their own accounts of the violations they
suffered,and recommend reparation measures; and
4. Compilng a report detailing its activities and findings, and
recommend measures to prevent future abuses.
The idea of such a commission originated within the ANC in 1992-93. The
organisation was conducting investigations into human rights violations within its
own militar camps. It called for the establishment of a national trth commission,
which could see these violations in its full context. This was however, not picked into
up in the 1993 Interim Constitution. The last and final epilogue of this Constitution
adopted on 5 December 1993 only stated that amnesty should be granted and directed
Parliament to adopt a law providing for the mechanisms, criteria and procedures for
the granting of amesty. The outgoing regime was strongly in favour of a blanket
amnesty for all. This position was unacceptable to the ANC while certain lobby
groups and NGOs were going even furtherbeingopposed to any form of amnesty. 
5
5 See more on he origin and establishment of the TRC in A. Boraine, A Country Unmasked. Inside
South Africa 's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Cape Town: Oxford University Press 2000, and
1. de Lange, "The historical context, legalorigins and philosophical foundations of the South Afrcan
Truth and Reconcilation Commission", pp. 14-31 in C. Vila-Vicencio & W. Verwoerd (eds.), Looking
back. Reaching forward. Rejlections on the Truth and Reconcilation Commission of South Africa,
Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press 2000. Boraine was the deputy chair of the TRC and played
a crucial role in developing the idea of a trth commission after having established an NGO dedicated
to this. De Lange is an ANC member ofParliament and was chairing Parliaments Justice Committee
when the TRC Act was debated and passed.
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The parliament passed the required legislation in July 1995. This followed months of
negotiations, three hundred hours of public hearings and a five-hour plenar debate.
The TRC was to be led by 17 commissioners. They were appointed by the President
after an equally public and transparent process of nomination and debates.
The work of the TRC commenced in December 1995. It was divided in three
committees: the Human Rights Violation Committee, the Reparations and
Rehabilitation Committee, and the Amesty Committee. The members of the
Amesty Committee were appointed directly by the President and the Committee had
a quasi-independent position vis-à-vis TRC. At the height of its activities the TRC had
a staff of several hundred, including some 20 investigators seconded from foreign
countres. The total expenditure for the two-year period 1995-97 was, according tot
the TRC accounts, about 66 milion Rand. (In addition, a number of TRC activities
were fuded separately and outside the offcial budget). Most of the funding came
from domestic sources and through allocations from the Departent of Justice, but
significant funding also came from foreign donors.
The uniqueness of the South Afrcan TRC lies not only in the size. It also lies in the
power of the Commission, particularly in the power to grant amesty to individual
perpetrators. No other country has combined ths quasi-judicial power with the
investigative task of an administrative truth-seeking body. The TRC also had the
power to subpoena witnesses, to search premises and to seize evidence. Furthermore,
it also maintained a witness protection programme, a first among truth commissions.6
How then did the TRe perform ? The answer to this and the assessment below is
based on three dimensions of its work; the search for truth, amnesty to perpetuators,
and reparation and reconciliation.7
Finding the truth
The TRC was obliged to find the "facts" about gross human rights violations during a
specified time period from the banning of the liberation movements in 1960 to the
inauguration of the new President in May 1994. A series ofhighly publicised hearings
dominated the Commissions work in 1996 and 1997. Victims and perpetrators came
forward and told about gresome cases of political violence and human rights
violations. This was followed in 1997 and 1998 by collections of statements. The bulk
ofTRC's more than 21 000 officially recognised victims came forward through these
written statements. The statements were coded and fed into TRC's comprehensive
6 See more on the comparative aspects of TRC in P. Haynes "Same species, different animal: how
South Afrca compares to trth commissions worldwide", pp. 32-41 in C. Vila-Vicencio & W.
Vervoerd (eds.) op.cit.
7 Apart from the literatue mentioned above the discussion also relies on R. A. Wilson, The Polities of
Truth and Reeoncilation in South Afriea. Legitimizzng the Post-Apartheid State, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2000, K. Chrstie, The South Afriean Truth Commission, London:
MacMilan 2000, and W. James & L. van de Vijver (eds.): After the TRe. Reflections on Truth and
Reconciliation in South Africa, Cape Town: David Philp Publishers. Par of the arguents below
have also been developed in my aricle (with 1. P. Holtedahl): "South Afrca: Tmth, Reconcilitation,
Justice?" (in Norwegian), pp. 176-202 in B. A. Andreassen & E. Skaar (eds.): Forsoning eller
rettferdighet? Om beskyttelse av menneskerettigheter gjennom sannhetskommisjoner og rettstribunaler,
Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag 1998.
5
database which provided a main source of information in the preparation of TRC's
five-volume report.
The collection of data on human rights violations fed into both the Commission's own
investigative work and into the work of the Amnesty Committee. In several cases
TRC's work enabled it to shed new light on or even solve political crimes and human
rights violations committed in the past.
ParalleI to the TRC's own work there was a substantial media coverage, especially in
1996 and 1997, of the human rights violations and the aparheid past. Its public
hearings were also transmitted live - several hours daily - on radio. Few might have
read the TRC's report, but its work captured the nation in away few could have
imagined. Few could now say that they did not know about the atrocities committed
in the past.
The findings from the statements and TRC's investigations provided the bulk of the
information contained in TRC's five-volume report published in late 1998.8 This also
marked the end of the commission' s work. Only the Amesty Committee continued to
function in order to process the amesty applications (see below). With the
finalisation of this in 2001, TRC shall be officially closed down 31 December 2001
with the release of a final report or addendum to the 1998 report.
TRC's search for truth also received criticism. Most fudamentally, a critique was
raised against the Commission's focus on gross human rights violence. The mandate
limited TRC's work to extreme events and not on the everyday, mundane bureaucratic
enforcement of apartheid. The commission, according to these critics, tended to have
a narrow, individualistic and legalistic approach to human rights violations, which led
to a neglect of aparheid as a system and to an avoidance of the beneficiaries of racial
oppression and discrimination.9
TRC's rather narrow human rights perspective was partly established through an
analogy with the Latin American dictatorships and the experiences of the trth
commissions there. The similarities with Latin America did however obscure what
was distinctive about aparheid. For the violence of aparheid was directed less at
individuals than at entire communities. And this violence was not simply politicaL. It
was not just about defending power but also about dispossessing people of the means
of livelihood though the creation of reserves and "homelands", group areas, migrant
labour, pass laws and forced removals. The search for trth in South Afrca, it is
claimed, must go beyond the distinctive relation between perpetuators and victims. It
must also captue the distinctive violence of apartheid and face the question
confronting South Afrca: how wil those who contiÌiue to be the beneficiaries of
aparheid, a substantial minority, and those who continue to be its victims, the
majority, live together?
8 See Truth and Reeonciliation Commission of South Afriea Report, volurnes 1-5, Cape Town: Juta
1998.
9 This point was most forcefully developed by, Mahood Mamdani, a Ugandan scholar living in South
Afrca at the time. See his "Reconciliation withoutjustice", Southern African Review of Books, No 46,
1996: 3-5.
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This criticism was reinforced by the technology employed by TRC in compiling its
data. TRC' s information management system was based on a large-scale American
human rights database. The system was designed to break the narrative contained in
the statements from victims and others into quantifiable acts. Complex events and
people were divided into constituent acts (48 acts in the case of events, or three
categories in the case ofpersons). Thisreinforced the tendency to focus on individual
acts. io
The TRC spent considerable time grappling with these issues and the
operationalisation of a "gross human rights violation". Its approach and definitions
also changed over time. Based on the 1995 Act, which also prescribed that the
Commission should contextualise the violations, TRC he1d a series of special
institutional hearings focusing on the role of some of the influential sectors of the
apartheid society. This included the media, business, prisons, the faith community, the
legal system and the health sector. This is also reflected in certain sections of the five-
volume report.
Another criticism has been an accusation of political basis. The former regime and Its
support groups have been reluctant and have increasingly come to see TRC's work as
a "witch-hunt".ll From a different perspective the ANC also criticised the final report
for its failure to distinguish properly between the just war of the liberation movements
and the crimes of aparheid. It even sought a cour interdict to stop the publication of
the report.
Despite this criticism and the failures and shortcomings of TRC report, this author
would stil conc1ude that TRC's effort in putting together the truth was a success. The
success should primarily be located in how the Commission worked, and less on the
final reports and specific outputs. Of equal importance is the role of the media and the
public debate sparked by the TRC investigations and hearings. The TRC succeeded in
breaking a regime of offcial denial of atrocities by ending the silence on violence and
violations. In so doing, the Commission managed to expose the excesses of the
previous politicalorder. By discrediting aparteid it has made an important
contrbution in consolidating the new democracy in South Afrca.
The TRe report is not the final or authoritative trth. There are also signficant gaps
(it has, e.g., not produced a list ofvictims who died or disappeared). TRC was the first
and most important attempt to deal with past. There wil be many more "truths" and
"truth-telling" exercises for decades to come.
Amnesty
TRC's Amesty Committee was established after the Commission, but without a
similar public and transparent process. The President appointed 5 members - three
io On TRC and the human rights information management see especially R. A. Wilson op.eit. and L.
Buur, Institutionalising truth. Vietims, perpetrators and professionals in the everyday work of the South
Afriean truth and reeonciliation eommission, Unpublished Ph.D. disserttion, Deparent of
Ethography and Social Anthopology, Aarhus University, 2000.
11 Anthea Jeffery argues that TRC's methodology was fundamentally flawed and that TRC is fostering
a new form of Orwellan trth and political indoctrination. See her The Truth about the Truth
Commission, Johanesburg: South Afrcan Institute of Race Relations 1999.
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judges and two TRC commissioners. This figue has since increased significantly to
enable the committee to car out its tasks properly. Decisions by the Amesty
Committee are binding on both the TRC as a whole and on the governent. By
contrast the main TRC's decisions are confined to the status ofrecommendations.
The 1995 Act providing for the establishment of the TRC also specified the
conditions for amesty. It is not possible with a blanket amesty. Amesty only
comes into question in an individual case. The perpetrator must personally apply in
the prescribed form within a certain time limit; appeár at a public hearing; make a full,
public confession; and comply with the criteria for amesty. The criteria were
basicallythat the human rights violation was committed in order to achieve a political
objective and that the applicant told the full trth. There was no requirement to regret
the act committed, to apologise to the victims orto express remorse.
Once satisfied that the applicant satisfies the criteria an amesty wil be granted. The
decision is final and there is no possibility for appeaL. There is also criminal-
procedural protection for the amesty applicant under which evidence that may
incriminate is later made inadmissible in court.
When the. deadline for applications expired (in May 1997) more than 7000 had
applied for amesty. However, it turned out that the vast majority of the applications
were from ordinarcriminals seeking an early release from prison. When the
Amesty Committee had completed its hearngs and reviews of all applications in
mid-2001 some 5400 applications had been turned down with the rest being granted
in par or in fulL. By and large the Amesty Committee tended to approve all
applications where the perpetuator(s) could c1aim a political objective and provide a
reasonable justification for this and if they were convinced that the whole truth was
told.
This South Afrcan way of handling amesty applications tumed the process into a
tool to uncover details of past crimes. The peculiarty of the South Afrcan modellies
primarly in the incentive for perpetuators to come forward with detail ed and public
accounts of their actions. If they failed to come forward they could risk prosecution.
They could be accused by victims or witnesses, or they could .be named by colleagues
applying for amnesty.
The mode1 was only parly successful. The TRC did manage to uncover significant
new material, but most importantly the public hearngs played a crucial role in
creating a common South Afrcan understanding of the crimes of the apareid past.
The amnesty provision was less successful in securing applications. Relatively few
applied considering the vast number of human rights violations. Those that applied
were also mainly associated with the police with few coming from e.g. the military.
Even more noticeable was the near total absence of applications from the instigators
of violence - those responsible for planng and policy decisions, and for establishing
the institutional and political framework for human rights violations.
Reparations and reconcilation
South Afrca's TRC was also fairly unique among trth commssions in its strong
emphasis on reconciliation. The slogan of TRC was typically also Truth - The Road
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to Reconcilation. It turned out to be the most difficult part ofTRC's mission and the
one were it was least successfuL.
First, it always remained unc1ear what the meaning of the term reconciliation was. For
many it seemed to be that victims and survivors should reconcile with their
perpetuators. This focus was pI'obably also motivated by the strong theological
concerns of TRC's Chair, Desmond Tutu, and Deputy Chair, Alex Boraine. Their
emphasis on reconciliation was heavily influenced by Chrstian values and their own
religious background.
Measured against reconciliation between victims and perpetuators the TRC was a
failure. True, the public hearngs in 1995-96 became national rituals of reconcilation,
forgiveness and truth-telling, but only a small fraction of the victims and perpetuators
were involved. The feeling also started to give way to frstration, even anger from
those victims who would not or could not forgive so easily, or who first requested a
sincere apology and perhaps symbolic reparation from the wrongdoer. The growing
emphasis of collection of statements and the phasing out of hearings seerned to have
reinforced this tendency.
The focus on victims and reconciliation also implied the need to address the issue of
reparation. The TRC had no funds or resources available for distrbution. It did,
however, provide recommendations for some compensation for the victims and
survvors. This inc1uded a proposal for an annual financial contrbution to victims
over a period of six years. Parliament allocated the first amount to a fund for this in
2001, but on the whole the administrative treatment of victims since they came
forward has been rather shabby.
The delays in providing reparations has caused much bitterness among victims,
especially as they are kept waiting while the perpetuators are getting away with
amesties. These problems have been aggravated by TRC's changing criteria for
being recognised a victim. The relatively low number ofvictims (21 000) also suggest
that a significant number of victims have failed to come forward and be registered.
TRC also gradually _ began to shift its focus towards national and political
reconciliation de-emphasising reconciliation at the individual leveL. Many key
members of the commission began to talk of reconciliation as something that would
require many years.12 The TRC throughthe disclosure of the truth about specific
human rights violations would facilitate the basis for peaceful co~existence, which
would provide the substrate from which forgiveness and national reconciliation may
later grow.
The 1998 report from the TRC also provides a number of recommendations and
issues for consideration. The Commission has also touched upon political economy
and race issues. Inter alia it recommends a redistrbution of resources from the
beneficiaries of apartheid to South Afrca's poor. Among the specific issues it
12 See C. vila-Vicencio (ed.): Transcending a Century of Injustice, Cape Town: Institute for Justice
and Reconciliation 2000. The book contains papers presented at the launch of the Institute for Justice
and Reeonciliation in May 2000. The Institute is a university-based NGO led by Charles Vila-
Vicencio, the former head ofTRC's Research Deparent.
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requests the governent to consider is the introduction of a special wealth tax. The
governent has acted upon few ofTRC's recommendations.
It was noted in the beginning of this paper that South Afrca had made significant
progress in nation-building and political reconciliation. It is difficult to isolate the role
ofTRC in this process. It has probably been less than many foreign observers assurne.
Its biggest achievement may lie in the fact that it enabled the new South Afrca to
address the atrocities of the past. That may have been crucial in enabling the new .
democracy to move forward. It also helped to discredit apartheid and its support
groups, and it played a role in strengthening democratic values.
Truth and reconcilation: Lessons from South Africa
Truth commissions have emerged as standard post-conflict strctures to investigate
cases arising from past injustices, atrocities and human rights violations. For countres
moving from authoritarianism to demooracy with crumbling economies and fractured
social orders terms such as "truth" and "reconciliation" have emerged as ideological
adhesives. This has been accompanied - and partlyaIso driven by - an academic
literature on transitonal justice.13
The increased interest in trth commissions - there has been about 20 such bodies in
the last 30 years - is a reflection also of the limited success in judicial approaches.
Many new governents are tuinK to mechanisms outside the judicial system to
confront, as well as learn from the crimes and injustices of the past. The justification
has also changed. With a focus on tribunals and trials the reference to the need for
justice was strong. Now the justification is much more on reconciliation and building
a human rights culture for the future.
Some conclusions and recommendations can be drawn from the South Afrcan and the
transitional justice literature.
The first is that therè is no universal model for how a countr emerging out of a
violent conflct and authoritaranism shall deal with its past. This wil depend on the
local context. The approach crucially depends on power relations, the strengt of the
former regime and its alles, and the nature of the past repression and injustices.
Second, the search for trth and reconciliation is ongoing and in one sense may never
end. The timing of a truth commission is however important. It has to be introduced at
the right time and its period of operations must be limited. Different strategi es may
also be used at different tiines. A single strategy is rarely sufficient.
Third, local ownership and legitimacy is important to ensure success although
international agencies can be important and sometimes crucial in supporting and
facilitating the process.
13 This discussion also borrows from the overview provided in Sir Gloppen, Reeonciliation and
Democratisation. Outlining the researchfield, Bergen CMI, October 2001 (A report commissioned by
the Norwegian Ministr of Foreign Affairs). See also Elin Skaa: "Truth Commissions, Trials or
Nothing? - Policy Options in Democratic Transitions", Third World Quarterly voL. 20, 1999: 1109-28.
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Fourthly, the public process of the South Afrcan Commission stands out as one the
most important factors behind its achievement and successes. The lessons from this,
and from the popular mobilisation, should be carefully studied by other trth countres
contemplating the establishing such commissions.
Fifhly, the granting of amesty only after individual applications is an important
principle and a major improvement compared to the issuing ofblanket amnesties. It is
also important as a tool to uncover details of past crimes. It may however, not always
be feasible.
Final/y, the victims and survivors are generally the ones than benefit least also from
truth commissions. Much greater efforts must be made to provide assistance to them
both inside, outside and after the work of such commissions.
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